Boeing’s Unauthorized Work Shoudl Have Been Caught Years Ago

Let’s start off with a dose of reality: if a panel flies off your airplane mid-air, something has gone seriously wrong. On January 5, an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 9 experienced just that. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), this emergency was entirely avoidable. The NTSB Chair, Jennifer Homendy, was clear: “The Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 9 mid-air emergency was avoidable and should have been addressed earlier by Boeing.” This isn’t some isolated incident—it’s a symptom of a much bigger issue at Boeing that should have been caught years ago.

The Depth of the Problem

Let’s be clear, this isn’t a one-off. The NTSB has repeatedly criticized Boeing for ignoring unauthorized production work, repeatedly noted in audits and compliance reviews. Boeing’s quality control problems stemmed from a culture that ignored important safeguards. As highlighted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), issues of unauthorized work have led to increased investigations and oversight. One shocking example includes a missing documentation for a door plug removal and reinstallation, which was delivered without four crucial bolts. NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy criticized Boeing for not addressing unauthorized production work, which had been noted in numerous audits and compliance reviews.

FAA’s Response and Consequences

The FAA, however, isn’t standing idle. It has imposed limits on Boeing’s production and mandated significant improvements in quality control procedures. Currently, there are 16 ongoing enforcement actions against Boeing, with half of them initiated post-incident. This points to a significant level of negligence that has persisted within Boeing for years, impacting not only their product quality but their reputation as well.

The Troubling History

Boeing’s troubles go back over two decades, rooted in decisions from 25 years ago. Aggressive cost-cutting started with CEO Philip Condit’s 1997 acquisition of McDonnell Douglas and only worsened with the 2001 move of Boeing’s headquarters from Seattle to Chicago. This move effectively separated executives from engineers, which led to increasingly poor decision-making.

Philip Condit’s move of Boeing’s headquarters from Seattle to Chicago in 2001 separated executives from engineers.

Leadership and Culture

Subsequent CEOs have focused more on short-term profits over engineering excellence. Harry Stonecipher famously rejected new aircraft designs in favor of upgrading older models, aiming for maximum short-term gain at the expense of safety and innovation.

Harry Stonecipher rejected new aircraft designs in favor of upgrading older models and maximizing short-term profits. Aggressive cost-cutting and leadership changes have eroded Boeing’s once-strong engineering culture.

Moving Forward

The current CEO, David Calhoun, has his hands full with the task of not only restoring Boeing’s business but — more critically — its quality. Balancing leadership decisions with maintaining a robust engineering culture is essential for the long-term success of the company.

For a company that once represented the pinnacle of American engineering, returning to those heights will take more than just a PR campaign. It requires a fundamental shift back to valuing safety and quality over profits, much like Boeing’s roots.

You would think that a company responsible for keeping thousands of people in the air would be a tad more detail-oriented, right? As we’ve seen, that clearly hasn’t been the case. But here’s hoping this scandal, fallout, and a hefty fine might finally force Boeing to return to its roots — prioritizing quality and safety over short-term gains.

Let’s keep an eye on them, folks. History reveals that when companies get too focused on bottom lines, their moral compass tends to go haywire. And when it comes to air travel, that’s a risk we simply can’t afford.